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Abstract—Over the last few years, a rapidly increasing number
of Internet-of-Things (IoT) systems that adopt voice as the
primary user input have emerged. These systems have been
shown to be vulnerable to various types of voice spoofing attacks.
Existing defense techniques can usually only protect from a
specific type of attack or require an additional authentication step
that involves another device. Such defense strategies are either
not strong enough or lower the usability of the system. Based
on the fact that legitimate voice commands should only come
from humans rather than a playback device, we propose a novel
defense strategy that is able to detect the sound source of a voice
command based on its acoustic features. The proposed defense
strategy does not require any information other than the voice
command itself and can protect a system from multiple types
of spoofing attacks. Our proof-of-concept experiments verify the
feasibility and effectiveness of this defense strategy.
I. INTRODUCTION
An increasing number of IoT systems rely on voice input
as the primary user-machine interface. For example, voice-
controlled devices such as Amazon Echo, Google Home,
Apple HomePod, and Xiaomi AI allow users to control their
smart home appliances, adjust thermostats, activate home
security systems, purchase items online, initiate phone calls,
and complete many other tasks with ease. In addition, most
smartphones are also equipped with smart voice assistants
such as Siri, Google Assistant, and Cortana, which provide
a convenient and natural user interface to control smartphone
functionality or IoT devices. Voice-driven user interfaces allow
hands-free and eyes-free operation where users can interact
with a system while focusing their attention elsewhere. Despite
their convenience, voice controlled systems (VCSs) also raise
new security concerns due to their vulnerability to voice replay
attacks [1], i.e., an attacker can replay a previously recorded
voice to make an IoT system perform a specific (malicious) ac-
tion. Such malicious actions include the opening and unlocking
of doors, making unauthorized purchases, controlling sensitive
home appliances (e.g., security cameras and thermostats), and
transmitting sensitive information. While a simple voice replay
attack is relatively easy to detect by a user, and therefore
presents only a limited threat, recent studies have pointed out
more concerning and effective types of attacks, including self-
triggered attacks [2], [3], inaudible attacks [4], [5], and human-
imperceptible attacks [6], [7], [8]. These attacks are very
different from each other in terms of their implementation,

Fig. 1. A voice controlled system (e.g., Google Home, shown in the red
rectangle) not only accepts voice commands from humans, but also from
playback devices, such as loudspeakers, headphones, and phones. An attacker
may take advantage of this by embedding hidden voice commands into
online audio or video to maliciously control the VCS. Since legitimate voice
commands should only come from a human (rather than a playback device),
identifying if the sound source is a human speaker is a possible defense
strategy for different types of attack as long as the malicious command is
replayed by an electronic device.
which requires different domain knowledge in areas such as
operating systems, signal processing, and machine learning.
Some of these attacks are described in [9] and an illustration
of a typical attack scenario is shown in Figure 1.
In order to defend against such attacks, multiple defense
strategies have been proposed [1], [10], [11], [12]. However,
most existing defense technologies can either only defend
against one specific kind of attack or require an additional
authentication step using another device, which limits the
effectiveness and usability of the voice controlled system. For
example, AuDroid [2] defends against self-triggered attacks
by managing the audio channel authority of the victim device,
but it cannot defend against other types of attacks. VAuth [12]
guarantees that the voice command is from a user by collecting
body-surface vibrations of the user via a wearable device,
but the required wearable device (i.e., earbuds, eyeglasses,
or necklaces) is inconvenient to the user. Hence, a defense
strategy that is robust to multiple types of attacks and min-
imally impacts the usability of a VCS is highly desirable.
Towards this end, we explore a new defense strategy that
identifies and rejects received voice commands that are not
from a human speaker, merely by using the acoustic cues of
the voice command itself. We find that the voice command
from humans and playback devices can be differentiated based
on the differences of the sound production mechanism. The
advantage of this strategy is that it does not require any
additional information other than the voice command itself
and it therefore does not impact the usability of a VCS, while
at the same time being robust to all variants of replay attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section II,
we review and classify state-of-the-art attack techniques faced
by current voice controlled systems, arriving at the conclusion
that most attacks are actually variants of the replay attack. In
Section III, we propose our new defense strategy and compare
it with existing defense approaches. In Section IV, we present
experimental evaluation results. Finally, we conclude the paper
in Section V.
II. ATTACKS ON VOICE CONTROLLED SYSTEMS
In order to develop an effective defense strategy, it is
important to have a good understanding of typical attack
scenarios and state-of-the-art attack techniques. With the
rapidly growing popularity and capabilities of voice-driven
IoT systems, the likelihood and potential damage of voice-
based attacks also grow very quickly. As discussed in [2],
[13], [11], an attack may lead to severe consequences, e.g., a
burglar could enter a house by tricking a voice-based smart
lock or an attacker could make unauthorized purchases and
credit card charges via a compromised voice-based system.
Such attacks can be very simple, but still very difficult or
even impossible to detect by humans. Voice attacks can also
be hidden within other sounds and embedded into audio and
video recordings. In addition, these attacks can be executed
remotely, i.e., the attacker does not have to be physically close
to the targeted device, e.g., compromised audio and video
recordings can easily be distributed via the Internet. Once a
recording is played back by a device such as the loudspeaker
of a phone or laptop, the attack can impact VCSs nearby. It
is very easy to scale up such attacks, e.g., a hidden malicious
audio sample can be embedded into a popular YouTube video
or transmitted via broadcast radio and thereby target millions
of devices simultaneously.
A fundamental reason for the vulnerability of voice-
controlled IoT systems is that they continuously listen to the
environment to accept voice commands, providing users with
hands-free and eyes-free operation of IoT systems. However,
this also provides attackers with an always available voice
interface. Several potential points of attack are shown in
Figure 2. Although the implementations of existing attack
techniques are very different, their goals are the same: to gen-
erate a signal that leads a voice controlled system to execute
a specific malicious command that the user cannot detect or
recognize. In the following sections, we classify representative
state-of-the-art attack approaches according to their type of
implementation. The attacker performance discussed in this
section is taken from the original publications, but note that
due to the rapid developments in the area of cloud-based
systems, the attacker performance is likely to change quickly
over time.
Command
ƻ 
Machine LearningHuman Voice Digital Speech Signal Execu!onƻ 
ƻ 
ƻ 
Fig. 2. A typical voice-driven device captures the human voice, converts
it into a digital speech signal, and feeds it into a machine learning model.
The corresponding command is then executed by the connected IoT devices.
Potential points of attack in this scenario include: 1: spoofing the system using
previously recorded audio, 2: hacking into the operating system to force the
voice-driven software to accept commands erroneously, 3: emitting carefully
designed illegitimate analog signals that will be converted into legitimate
digital speech signals by the hardware, and 4: using carefully crafted speech
adversarial examples to fool the machine learning model.
A. Impersonation Attack
An impersonation attack, i.e., someone other than the au-
thorized user using a VCS maliciously, is the simplest attack
and does not require any particular expertise or knowledge.
However, this attack cannot be executed remotely and does not
scale well. It requires that the attacker is in close proximity
of the VCS device, which is a rare attack scenario since these
devices are typically placed within a person’s home or on the
person’s body. Therefore, this attack poses only a limited threat
to VCSs.
B. Basic Voice Replay Attack
Voice replay attacks, i.e., an attacker makes a VCS perform
a specific malicious action by replaying a previously recorded
voice sample [1], [10], [11]. This attack can be executed
remotely, e.g., via the Internet. A shortcoming of the basic
voice replay attack is that it is easy to detect and therefore
has limited practical impact. Nevertheless, as shown later in
this section, voice replay attacks are the basis of other more
advanced and dangerous attacks.
C. Operating System Level Attack
Compared to basic voice replay attacks, an operating system
(OS) level attack exploits vulnerabilities of the OS to make the
attack self-triggered and more imperceptible. Representative
examples of this are the A11y attack [3], GVS-Attack [2], and
the approach presented in [13]. In [3], the authors propose
a malware that collects a user’s voice and then performs a
self-replay attack as a background service. In [2], the authors
further verify that the built-in microphone and speaker can
be used simultaneously and that the use of the speaker does
not require user permission on Android devices. They take
advantage of this and propose a zero-permission malware,
which continuously analyzes the environment and conducts
the attack once it finds that no user is nearby. The attack
uses the device’s built-in speaker to replay a recorded or
synthetic speech, which is then accepted as a legitimate
command. In [13], the authors propose an interactive attack
that can execute multiple-step commands. OS level attacks
are usually self-triggered by the victim device and therefore
rather dangerous and practical.
TABLE I
REPRESENTATIVE VOICE ATTACK TECHNIQUES
Attack Name Attack Type Implementation
GVS Attack [2] Operating System Continuously analyze the environment and conduct voice replay attack
using the built-in microphone when the opportunity arises.
A11y Attack [3] Operating System Collect the voice of a user and perform a self-replay attack as a
background service.
Monkey Attack [13] Operating System Bypass authority management of the OS and perform an interactive
voice replay attack to execute more advanced commands.
Dolphin Attack [4] Hardware Emit ultrasound signal that can be converted into a legitimate speech
digital signal by the MEMS microphone.
IEMI Attack [5] Hardware Emit AM-modulated signal that can be converted into a legitimate
speech digital signal by the wired microphone-capable headphone.
Cocaine Noodles [14] Machine Learning Similar to the hidden voice command.
Hidden Voice Command [6] Machine Learning Mangle malicious voice commands so that they retain enough acoustic
features for the ASR system, but become unintelligible to humans.
Houdini [15] Machine Learning Produce sound that is almost no different to normal speech, but fails
to be recognized by both known or unknown ASR systems.
Speech Adversarial Example [7] Machine Learning Produce sound that is over 98% similar to any given speech, but makes
the DNN model fail to recognize the gender, identity, and emotion.
Targeted Speech Adversarial Example [8] Machine Learning Produce sound that is over 99.9% similar to any given speech, but
transcribes as any desired malicious command by the ASR.
D. Hardware Level Attack
A hardware level attack replays a synthetic non-speech
analog signal instead of human voice. The analog signal
is carefully designed according to the characteristics of the
hardware (e.g., the analog-digital converter). The signal is
inaudible, but can be converted into a legitimate digital speech
signal by the hardware. Representative approaches are the
Dolphin attack [4] and the IEMI attack [5]. In [4], the authors
utilize the non-linearity of a Micro Electro Mechanical Sys-
tems (MEMS) microphone over ultrasound and successfully
generate inaudible ultrasound signals that can be accepted as
legitimate target commands. In [5], the authors take advantage
of the fact that a wired microphone-capable headphone can
be used as a microphone and an FM antenna simultaneously
and demonstrate that it is possible to trigger voice commands
remotely by emitting a carefully designed inaudible AM-
modulated signal. Hardware level attacks typically need a
special signal generator and are typically used to affect mobile
VCSs in crowded environments (e.g., airport).
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Fig. 3. An illustration of machine learning adversarial examples. Studies
have shown that by adding an imperceptibly small, but carefully designed
perturbation, an attack can successfully lead the machine learning model to
making a wrong prediction. Such attacks have been used in computer vision
(upper graphs) [16] and speech recognition (lower graphs) [7], [8], [15].
E. Machine Learning Level Attack
State-of-the-art voice controlled systems are usually
equipped with an automatic speech recognition (ASR) algo-
rithm to convert digital speech signal to text. Deep neural
network (DNN) based algorithms such as DeepSpeech [17]
can achieve excellent performance with around 95% word
recognition rate and hence dominate the field. However, re-
cent studies show that machine learning models, especially
DNN based models, are vulnerable to attacks by adversarial
examples [16]. That is, machine learning models might mis-
classify perturbed examples that are only slightly different
from correctly classified examples (illustrated in Figure 3
for both video and audio scenarios). In speech, adversarial
samples can sound like normal speech, but will actually be
recognized as a completely different malicious command by
the machine, e.g., an audio file might sound like “hello”, but
will be recognized as “open the door” by the ASR system.
In recent years, several examples of such attacks have been
studied [6], [7], [8], [14], [15], [18]. Cocaine Noodles [14]
and Hidden Voice Command [6] are the first efforts to utilize
the differences in the way humans and computers recognize
speech and to successfully generate adversarial sound exam-
ples that are intelligible as a specific command to ASR systems
(Google Now and CMU Sphinx), but are not easily under-
standable by humans. The limitation of the approach in [14],
[6] is that the generated audio does not sound like legitimate
speech. A user might notice that the malicious sound is an
abnormal condition and may take counteractions. More recent
efforts [15], [7], [8] take advantage of an intriguing property
of DNN by generating malicious audio that sounds almost
completely like normal speech by adopting a mathematical
optimization method. The goal of these techniques is to design
a minor perturbation in the speech signal that can fool an ASR
system. In [8], the authors propose a method that can produce
an audio waveform that is less than 0.1% different from a
given audio waveform, but will be transcribed as any desired
text by DeepSpeech [17]. In [7], the authors demonstrate that
a 2% designed distortion of speech can make state-of-the-
art DNN models fail to recognize the gender and identity
of the speaker. In [15], the authors show that such attacks
are transferable to different and unknown ASR models. Such
attacks are dangerous, because users do not expect that normal
speech samples, such as “hello”, could be translated into a
malicious command by a VCS.
Table I provides a summary of these attack techniques.
One important observation is that all existing attacks (except
impersonation) are based on the replay attack. That is,
OS level and machine learning level attacks replay a sound
into the microphone of the target device. Hardware level
attacks replay a specifically designed signal using some signal
generator. In other words, the sound source is always another
electronic device (e.g., loudspeaker or signal generator) instead
of a human speaker. This same fact makes it possible for
such attacks to be performed remotely and at a large scale.
However, only spoken commands from a live speaker should
be accepted as legitimate, which means that the identity of
the sound source could be used to differentiate legitimate
from potentially malicious voice commands. That is, if we
can determine if the received signal is from a live speaker or
an electronic device, we are able to prevent multiple (including
yet unknown) types of VCS attacks. These observations and
objectives lead us to the design of a defense strategy that relies
on detecting the source of acoustic signals as presented in this
paper.
III. SOUND SOURCE IDENTIFICATION
A. Existing Defense Strategies
Various defense strategies have been proposed to help VCSs
defend against specific types of attacks. For example, the
work in [10] proposes a solution called AuDroid to manage
audio channel authority. By using different security levels for
different audio channel usage patterns, AuDroid can resist
a voice attack using the device’s built-in speaker [2], [13].
However, AuDroid is only robust to such attacks. Adversarial
training [16], i.e., training a machine learning model that can
classify legitimate samples and adversaries is one defense
strategy against machine learning level attacks. In [6], the
authors train a logistic regression model to classify legitimate
voice commands and hidden voice commands, which achieves
a 99.8% defense rate. A limitation of adversarial training is
that it needs to know the details of the attack technology
and the trained defense model only protects against the cor-
responding attack. In practice, the attackers will not publish
their approaches and they can always change the parameters
(e.g., the perturbation factor in [7]) to bypass the defense.
That is, the defense range of adversarial training is limited
and in general, these defense techniques are able to address
only some vulnerabilities.
On the other hand, defense strategies that can resist multiple
types of attacks usually require an additional authentication
step with the help from another device. In [12], the authors
propose VAuth, which collects the body-surface vibration of
the user via a wearable device and guarantees that the voice
command is from the user. However, the required wearable
devices (i.e., earbuds, eyeglasses, and necklaces) may be
inconvenient for users. In [11], the authors propose a virtual
security button (VSButton) that leverages Wi-Fi technology to
detect indoor human motions and voice commands are only
accepted when human motion is detected. The limitation is
that voice commands are not necessarily accompanied with a
detectable motion. In [1], the authors determine if the source
of voice commands is a loudspeaker via a magnetometer and
reject such commands. However, this approach works only up
to 10cm, which is less than the usual human-device distance.
In summary, an additional authentication step (e.g., asking the
user to wear a wearable device, requiring that voice commands
are provided only when the body is in motion, or speaking very
close to the device) does indeed increase the security, but also
lowers the usability, which goes against the original design
intention of voice controlled systems.
Finally, other efforts [2], [6], [10] mention the possibility
of using automatic speaker verification (ASV) systems for
defense. However, this is also not strong enough, because an
ASV system itself is vulnerable to machine learning adversar-
ial examples [7] and previously recorded user speech [1], [6].
In addition, VCSs are often designed to be used by multiple
users and limiting use to certain users only will impact the
usability of a VCS.
B. Sound Source Identification Using Acoustic Cues
Based on the observations in Section II, identifying the
sound source can help defend against multiple types of at-
tacks. But adding an authentication step that requires a user
to provide additional information may hurt the usability of
VCS. Therefore, we are concerned with the question: can we
identify the sound source of a received voice command
by merely using information that is embedded in the
voice signal? In this work, we explore the possibility of
using acoustic features of a voice command to identify if
the producer is a live speaker or a playback device. The
motivation of this approach is that the sound production
mechanisms of humans and playback devices are different,
leading to a difference in frequencies and direction of the
output voice signal, e.g., the sound polar diagram of a human
is different from that of a playback device [19]; the sound
produced by a playback device usually contains effects of
unwanted high-pass filtering [20]; the signal produced by an
ultrasound generator contains carrier signal components [4],
which may further leave cues in the received digital audio
signal corresponding to the voice command. Therefore, it is
possible that such sound source differences can be modeled
using the acoustic features of the received digital audio signal.
From the perspective of bionics, we know that humans are
intuitively able to distinguish between a live speaker and a
playback device by only listening to (but not seeing) the
source.
It is worth mentioning that a similar technology for detect-
ing replay attacks has been studied to protect ASV systems
from spoofing [20], [21], [22]. However, ASV attacks and
VCS attacks are actually very different. As shown in Figure 4,
a typical replay attack can be divided into two phases: the
recording phase and the playback phase. In the recording
phase, the attacker records or synthesizes a malicious voice
command and during the playback phase, the malicious voice
command is transmitted from the playback device to the victim
device over the air. ASV attacks and VCS attacks differ during
both phases:
1) The Recording Phase: In ASV attack scenarios, an
attacker must either record or synthesize (e.g., using voice
conversion or cutting and pasting) the victim’s voice (i.e., the
voice of the authorized user) to be used as a malicious voice
command [23]. In both cases, various cues will be left in the
malicious command that can be used to detect the attack.
In contrast, a VCS typically accepts voice commands from
anyone and the attacker does not have to forge a particular
victim’s voice. This also means that typically few cues will
be left in the malicious voice command. In ASV attacks,
when the victim’s voice is being recorded, this typically has
to occur either via a telephone or far-field microphones, both
of which will have certain levels of channel or background
noise. The authors in [24], [25] explore the characteristics of
far-field recordings and how to use them to detect an attack.
In [26], the authors use channel noise patterns to distinguish
between a pre-recorded voice and the voice of a live speaker.
Further, in [27], [28], [29], the authors propose a scheme to
reject voice that is too similar to ones previously received
by the ASV system, because this could indicate a recorded
voice. On the other hand, forged voice commands generated
using voice conversion or cutting and pasting techniques can
also be distinguished from genuine voice samples [25], [30].
In contrast, in VCS attacks, faking a victim’s voice is not
needed, i.e., attackers can simply record their own voice at a
close distance and with a high-quality recorder to eliminate
background and channel noise in the voice command. Hence,
the background and channel noise features can no longer be
used to differentiate a fake voice from a real one. Malicious
commands are naturally different from the historical records in
a VCS, therefore, the approaches in [27], [28], [29] will also
fail. The attacker can also synthesize voice commands using a
text-to-speech system without the need of voice conversion or
copying and pasting and consequently, the approaches in [25],
[30] will also not work. In summary, the existing techniques
built to protect ASV systems are not a good fit for the defense
needs of a VCS.
2) The Playback Phase: In ASV applications, the micro-
phone is usually positioned very close to the user (i.e., less
than 0.5m). At such distances, some acoustic features can be
used to identify the sound source of the speaker, e.g., in [31],
[32], the authors use the “pop noise” caused by breathing
to identify a live speaker. Other efforts [33], [34], [35] do
not explicitly use close distance features, but the databases
they use to develop their defense strategies were recorded at
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Fig. 4. Typical replay attacks include a recording phase and a playback phase.
In the recording phase, the attacker records or synthesizes a malicious voice
command. In the playback phase, the malicious voice command is transmitted
from the playback device to the victim device over the air. Unique aspects of
attacks on a VCS (in contrast to an ASV system) are that malicious commands
can easily be generated (leaving very few cues in the command itself) during
the recording phase and the transmission distances can be very long during
the playback phase.
close distances [22], [36], and therefore, these approaches may
also implicitly use close-distance features. In contrast, with the
help of far-field speech recognition techniques, modern voice
controlled systems can typically accept voice commands from
rather long distances (i.e., several meters to tens of meters).
At such distances, close-distance features cannot be used to
distinguish between human speakers and recorded voice, e.g.,
the pop noise effect quickly disappears over larger distances.
In summary, VCS attack scenarios may leave only very
few cues during the recording phase that could help detect a
replay attack. Instead, we have to focus on the playback phase,
where we have to identify features that discriminate between
human and electronic commands, especially when commands
are given over larger distances. Modeling the sound production
and transmission over long distances with room reverberation
is complex, making it difficult to design the required features.
Therefore, in this work, we first extract a large acoustic feature
set and then use machine learning techniques to identify
the discriminative features. Since this is a new direction in
protecting attacks on a VCS, existing datasets are difficult
to use since they either contain recordings made over short
distances [37], [36] or they contain non-speech content [38].
Therefore, we collected our own dataset consisting of voice
commands produced by both humans and different playback
devices, and recorded at various distances from the speaker in
the playback phase (the details of this dataset are described
in Section IV-C). We further use the COVAREP [39] acoustic
feature extraction toolkit, which extracts 74 features per 10ms,
and then apply three statistic functions (mean, max, and min)
to each feature over the entire voice command sample, which
leads to a 222-dimensional feature vector for each voice
command sample. We use support vector machine (SVM) with
radial basis function (RBF) kernel as the machine learning
algorithm.
There are two considerations that facilitate the task of
building a sound source identification system for VCS using
acoustic features. First, the sound source identification can
be done in a text-dependent way, i.e., even though a voice
command could be any text, it usually needs to start with a
fixed wake word (such as “Alexa”, “Hey Google”, or “Hey
Siri”). We therefore only need to identify the source of the
fixed wake word, which eliminates the impacts of analyzing
Fig. 5. The VCS devices used in our experiments: Amazon Alexa-based
Amazon Echo Dot (left) and Google Home Mini (right). The Amazon Echo
Dot has 7 microphones, while the Google Home Mini has 2 microphones (the
microphone positions are shown with the rectangles).
Fig. 6. The playback devices used in our experiment: Sony SRSX5 loud-
speaker (left), Audio Technica ATH-AD700X headphone (middle), and iPod
touch (right).
different spoken texts. Second, a VCS typically runs only on
some dedicated devices that use a fixed microphone model,
e.g., Alexa runs on Amazon Echo devices, while Google Home
runs on Google Home devices. This means that the victim
device in Figure 4 is fixed, which eliminates another variable
in the playback phase. Otherwise, different microphones may
have different sound collection characteristics (e.g., frequency
response), which may be confused with differences in play-
back device characteristics and thereby affect the identifica-
tion.
IV. EXPERIMENTATION
A. Replay Attacks on VCSs
The lack of defense solutions against replay attacks has been
reported in multiple previous efforts [11], [13], but due to
the rapid advances of cloud-based systems, we first evaluate
replay attacks with the goal of verifying if state-of-the-art VCS
devices will reject replayed voice commands, especially when
a sensitive operation is requested. We run these experiments
with Amazon Alexa and Google Home devices as shown in
Figure 5. The user of these devices is an adult male. The
replay attack is performed using a synthetic voice command
by a female (implemented using Google Text-to-Speech, i.e.,
the resulting command will not sound completely natural to
humans). The content of the voice command is “Alexa, buy a
laptop” and “Hey Google, buy a laptop” with two subsequent
“Yes” commands. The voice commands are replayed using a
headphone (shown in Figure 6) at a 50cm distance to the VCS.
Experiment Environment 1 Experiment Environment 2
Fig. 7. Experiment locations: a typical meeting room (left) and a long corridor
(right). The VCS device/microphone location is indicated with the rectangle.
The right picture is taken from the edge of the attack range of the Amazon
Echo Dot.
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Fig. 8. The floor plan of experiment environment 1 (the room to the right).
The recording device of the experiments in Section IV-C is placed in the
circle. 22 positions are marked with the rectangles (P1-P22). The different
directions of the speakers in the experiments in Section IV-C are indicated by
the top left arrows.
This attack successfully makes Alexa place an order of a $350
laptop, while we found that Google Home currently does not
allow purchases over $100. Therefore, we changed the voice
command and successfully let Google Home place an order
of a $15 set of paper towels. Further tests also showed that
both devices will still perform the requested action when the
genuine male voice command and the replayed female voice
command are alternated in a single chat.
Note that both Alexa and Google Home provide a feature
to learn the voice of the user (i.e., “Alexa Your Voice” and
“Google Home Voice Match”). In our next experiment, we
enable this feature, let the VCS learn the voice of the male
user, and then repeat the above described attack. Alexa still
accepts the voice command and places the order as before,
while Google Home rejects the request, because of the voice
mismatch. We then repeat the attack using a pre-recorded
voice command of the user and successfully let Google Home
place an order. That is, this feature does not provide a strong
defense against replay attacks (note that the purpose of the
voice learning feature is to provide personalized services rather
than addressing a security concern). In addition, this feature
also affects the usability of legitimate shared use of a VCS.
TABLE II
THE REPLAY ATTACK RANGE OF AMAZON ECHO DOT AND GOOGLE HOME MINI
VCS Device Meeting Room Corridor
Headphone iPod Loudspeaker Headphone iPod LoudSpeaker
Amazon Echo Dot 1-19m 1-19m 1-22m 21.0m 22.4m 28.9m
Google Home Mini 1-18m 1-18m 1-21m 4.4m 4.7m 21.0m
To conclude, although there are constraints limiting the im-
pact of attacks on VCS devices, state-of-the-art VCS solutions
are not able to detect a replayed voice command, which leaves
a severe security flaw.
B. Attack Range Analysis
As discussed in Section III-B, for the proposed defense
strategy, we need to identify the source of the voice command
within the “attack range” of a VCS, i.e., the maximum distance
between a playback device and a VCS device. In other
words, we need to measure how far away the malicious voice
command can come from to still be accepted by the VCS. This
attack range depends on three parameters: (1) the playback
device itself, which affects the sound production, e.g., sound
volume and speaker directivity; (2) the environment, which
affects the sound transmission, the background noise, and the
room reverberation; (3) the VCS device itself, which affects
the sound collection. In this experiment, we test three playback
devices: Sony SRSX5 portable speaker, Audio Technica ATH-
AD700X headphone, and iPod Touch. The devices are tested in
two environments: a typical meeting room and a long corridor,
with two VCS devices (Amazon Echo Dot and Google Home
Mini), therefore, we have a total of 12 attack conditions. The
playback devices and environments are shown in Figures 6, 7,
and 8.
Since the attacks (with the exception of impersonation)
are based on the basic replay attack, in this experiment, we
measure the attack range of the basic reply attack. The attack
range of its variants may be shorter than this range, e.g., minor
perturbations of a machine learning level attack might not be
able to be captured by the VCS at larger distances [8]. We
perform the attacks in different positions in the environment
by replaying a synthetic voice command “Alexa, what’s the
weather today?” and “Hey Google, what’s the weather today?”
via the playback devices, repeating the experiments three
times. If the VCS accepts any one of the voice commands
and reports the weather, we regard the attack as successful.
As shown in Table II, all three variables have a large impact
on the attack range. In experiment environment 1 (meeting
room), the attack range of all three playback devices covers
the entire room (P1-P18 in Figure 8) for Alexa and Google
Home. We then opened the door of the room and extended the
experiments into the neighboring room (left room in Figure 8).
Here, we find that the attack range can be even larger (P19-
P22). We further repeat the experiment in environment 2
(corridor) and measure the longest straight-line attack distance.
This experiment provided the following findings:
1) The attack range is large. The attack range is larger
than expected, e.g., headphones are not designed for
replaying sound loudly, but their attack range still covers
a typical room. The attack range of a loudspeaker can
be over 25m (in the corridor) and go through a wall
(in the meeting room). This means that attacks can be
performed over long distances and even from a different
room.
2) The attack range depends on the VCS device. The
Amazon Echo Dot and the Google Home Mini differ
in their abilities to capture sound. That is, the Amazon
Echo Dot picks up commands over longer distances
and can therefore be attacked over a substantially larger
range. This is likely due to the fact that the Amazon
Echo Dot has seven microphones, while the Google
Home Mini has only two. Such a microphone array is
beneficial for far-field speech recognition, but while this
improves the usability of a VCS, it also increases the
risk of being attacked.
3) The attack range depends on the environment. The
attack range is also determined by the environment, e.g.,
the straight-line attack distance of headphone/iPod to
Google Home Mini in the corridor is only around 4.5m,
but their straight-line attack distance in the meeting room
is larger than 6m. This is likely due to the fact that
sound waves are attenuated differently in an open space
(corridor) compared to a closed space (meeting room).
4) The attack range depends on the playback device.
While it is unsurprising that the loudspeaker has a
greater volume and therefore a larger attack range, the
relationship between attack range and type of playback
device is more complex than simply a difference in
volume. For example, the attack range difference be-
tween headphone and Amazon Echo Dot and between
headphone and Google Home Mini is much larger than
that of the loudspeaker, indicating that there are other
factors at play besides a volume difference. The goal of
this work is to exploit such differences to help identify
the sound source.
C. Sound Source Identification
Considering that VCS devices are more likely to be placed
in a typical room rather than a corridor, we limit the following
experiments to the meeting room environment (experiment
environment 1). We use an iPod Touch to record the sound,
simulating the sound collection of a VCS device, because
we cannot directly access the sound stored in a commercial
VCS. We refer to this iPod Touch as “sound collector” in
the remainder of this section. The sound collector is placed
on one side of the room. We then record voice command
samples “Alexa” at 22 different positions, i.e., P1-P22 (shown
in Figure 8). The voice command is produced by (1) a
loudspeaker, (2) an iPod, (3) a headphone, and (4) a human
speaker. The voice commands (which are then replayed by the
playback devices) are recorded from a human speaker using
a professional recorder (Tascam DR-05) at a close distance
and in a quiet environment. This emulates a realistic attack
scenario, i.e., this will leave as few cues in the recording
phase as possible (the voice command itself is almost exactly
the same). At each position, we also record multiple voice
command samples that are produced when the speaker faces
different directions. In more detail, for the iPod and head-
phone, we record voice commands in positions P1-P18 and
at each position, we record three directions (all in forward
directions to the sound collector, i.e., directions 1-3 shown
in Figure 8). For the loudspeaker and human speaker, we
produce voice commands in positions P1-P22 and at each
position, we use five directions (both forward and backward
directions relative to the recorder, i.e., all directions 1-5 shown
in Figure 8). This is done because our previous results showed
that the loudspeaker has a larger attack range. Overall, after
eliminating a small number of samples due to undesired noise,
we obtained a dataset consisting of a total number of 296
voice command samples produced by different sound sources
(loudspeaker: 106, iPod: 44, headphone: 46, human: 100).
We then normalized each voice command sample waveform
to have the same max amplitude of 1 in order to make all voice
command samples have the same volume. We then extract a
222-dimensional feature vector using the COVAREP toolkit
and feed it to the SVM with an RBF kernel as described in
Section III-B. We use empirical hyperparameters: the cost of
SVM C = 1 and the γ of the RBF kernel = 0.25 (the reciprocal
of the number of classes). We then evaluate the results using
a ten-fold cross validation, where the training and testing sets
are independent from each other in each round.
The results of the experiment are shown in Figure 9. For the
human speaker-playback devices classification, i.e., where we
consider loudspeaker, iPod, and headphone as a single class,
we achieve an F1-score of 0.94 on the playback device and
0.90 on the human speaker class, leading to an average F1-
score of 0.92. We further find that human voice commands are
more likely to be misclassified as those reproduced by the iPod
and the headphone. That is, if we regard iPod and headphone
as a single class and take out the loudspeaker class (since
it is rarely misclassified with other classes), the F1-score is
0.87 in the new iPod-headphone class and 0.90 in the human
speaker class, leading to an average F1-score of 0.89. This
result tells us that the loudspeaker is very different from the
human speaker and even other playback devices, which can
therefore be easily identified. The iPod and headphone devices
are closer to the human speaker, but can still be effectively
identified. Interestingly, the microphone and iPod are difficult
to be classified as each other. All these results verify the
TABLE III
SELECTED ACOUSTIC FEATURES BY CORRELATION-BASED FEATURE
SUBSET SELECTION
Statistic Function Feature Selected (28)
Max Fundamental Frequency, MFCC(3,4,8,10,13)
Min MFCC(1,3,5,7,10,22)
Mean
Harmonic Structure (H1H2), HMPDM(4,6), HMPDD(0)
MFCC(1,3,4,7,8,12,13,14,15), Peak Slope
Fig. 9. The confusion matrix of the sound source classification test.
feasibility and effectiveness of using acoustic cues to identify
the sound source of a voice command.
We further use a feature selection algorithm (which we
did not use for learning the model, because it could lead to
overfitting in a small dataset) to analyze the discriminative
features. The results are shown in Table III, where we provide
the combination of features that contribute to the classifier,
including fundamental frequency, Mel-cepstral coefficients
(MFCCs), and harmonic model and phase distortion mean and
deviation (HMPDM, HMPDD). This indicates that modeling
such a classifier is complex and that the use of a machine
learning model is essential.
Finally, it needs to be mentioned that while the empirical
results are encouraging, the experiments are performed in
fixed environments using three representative playback devices
only. Therefore, the learned model may lack generalization.
In practice, there are infinite options for playback devices
and environments. Further, speaker variability should also
be considered. As a consequence, an important future step
will be to build a larger database containing a variety of
different conditions, which can then serve as the basis for the
development of more generalized machine learning models.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we first review state-of-the-art attack tech-
nologies and find that all of them (with the exception of the
impersonation attack) are based on the replay attack, where the
malicious voice command is produced by a playback device.
Based on the fact that legitimate voice commands should
only come from a human speaker, we then proposed a novel
defense strategy that uses the acoustic features of a speech
signal to identify the sound source of the voice command
and only accept the ones coming from the human. Compared
to existing defense strategies, the proposed approach has the
advantage that it minimally affects the usability of the VCS,
while being robust to most types of attacks. Since identifying
the sound source of voice commands in a far-field condition
has barely been studied before, we first measure the practical
attack ranges of modern VCS devices (i.e., Amazon Alexa
and Google Home) and then use the results to construct
a dataset consisting of both genuine and replayed voice
command samples. We then use this dataset to develop a
machine learning model that can be used to distinguish the
human speaker from the playback devices. Finally, our proof-
of-concept experiments verify the feasibility of the proposed
approach.
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